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Abstract—The first Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
(TDRS-1) was deactivated on June 27
th
 2010 following 
more than 26 years of operation. The end-of-mission (EOM) 
operations were developed to address the stringent 
requirements of NPR 8715.6: NASA Procedural 
Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris, which consists of 
three key items: 1) removal from the geosynchronous arc;  
2) depletion of the remaining propellant; and 3) passivation 
of all sources of energy storage or generation [1]. The EOM 
approach minimized risks while accomplishing these goals. 
Raising TDRS-1 over 350 km above geosynchronous was 
accomplished via proven station change operations. 
Depleting propellant was the most challenging task, 
requiring over 20 hours of thruster on-time accumulated 
within schedule, orbit, and spacecraft subsystem constraints. 
The attitude configuration and operational procedures, 
including the unique final passivation method, were 
thoroughly analyzed and simulated prior to the start of 
operations. The complete EOM campaign lasted 21 days. 
The TDRS-1 EOM campaign demonstrated that pre-NPR 
8715.6 satellite designs can be made to comply
1
 and that 
lessons learned could be applied to other satellite designs. 
The significant TDRS-1 effort demonstrates a commitment 
by NASA to responsible orbital debris management in 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Spacecraft Description 
The TDRS-1 preliminary design was completed in 1976, 
and the contract signed for 10 years of fixed-price, leased 
services from a joint commercial venture originally owned 
by Western Union. (Subsequently, the contract was fully 
transferred to NASA.) TDRS-1 development predated any 
orbital debris considerations, so no EOM passivation 
capability was provided for the spacecraft. TDRS-1 is a 
hexagonal, 3-axis stabilized spacecraft with several 
protruding booms and antennas (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 – TDRS-1 On-orbit Configuration 
This first generation TDRS spacecraft was built by TRW, 
Inc. Power was supplied through deployed solar arrays to 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110012816 2019-08-30T15:54:10+00:00Z
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the spacecraft bus; three 24-cell, nickel-cadmium (NiCd) 
batteries were connected to the bus for eclipse and 
contingency support. The power bus was unregulated, so 
when batteries were put online, the bus and payload 
operated at the unregulated battery voltage.  
Although modern for its day, little automation existed 
onboard TDRS-1. Limited resident modes were available 
and the capability did not exist to change or upload any new 
operational modes. Aside from some very limited, 
hardwired, autonomous power subsystem responses and 
firmware-sequenced keep-alive Attitude Control Subsystem 
(ACS) responses, all of the spacecraft functions were 
commanded from the ground.  
Propulsion fuel consisted of hydrazine monopropellant 
supplied by two tanks within the central hexagonal body. 
The hydrazine was pressurized with nitrogen using a 
flexible, diaphragm-type propellant management device. 
The spacecraft payload consisted of K-band, S-band, and C-
band telecommunication services. A space-to-ground link 
(SGL) K-band dish antenna supported bi-directional user 
data transmission as well as the telemetry and command 
(T&C) necessary for spacecraft operations. A mast-mounted 
S-band omni antenna supplemented the T&C functions and 
was used for loss of attitude, emergency-time-out support, 
Sun mode, and on-orbit storage.  
Brief History 
TDRS-1 was launched on April 4, 1983, from Space Shuttle 
Challenger (STS-6). During final orbit insertion, the second 
stage of the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) experienced a 
steerable nozzle malfunction resulting in a suspenseful 
separation from the IUS while tumbling end-over-end at 30 
rpm (only minutes of IUS battery life remained at 
separation), leaving it in a useless transfer orbit [2]. 
Fortunately, geosynchronous orbit (GEO) was successfully 
attained using two finger-sized, 4-newton, station-keeping 
thrusters with fuel originally baselined for 10 years of 
North/South station-keeping operations.  
 
 Figure 2 –TDRS-1 Dual Thruster Module Assembly 
Soon after upper stage separation and attempted Earth 
acquisition, a thruster-overheating problem specific to 
TDRS-1 resulted in a suspected hydrazine detonation that 
ruptured the A-side propulsion line near the negative roll 
thruster. The spacecraft was designed with a fully redundant 
propulsion system consisting of 12 A-side and another 12 
B-side thrusters, grouped in pairs in dual thruster modules 
(Figures 2 and 3—North/South thrusters not shown for 
clarity). Unfortunately, the B-side negative-roll thruster 
which resides close to the suspected detonation, displayed 
some performance issues. This event  disabled the entire A-
side propulsion system and as a precaution the B-side 
negative roll thruster was also taken out of service. Orbit 
adjustment maneuvers were developed to compensate for 
the total loss of negative roll thrusters which enabled a 
successful TDRS-1 orbit raising to GEO.  
ACS thruster overheating remained a problem throughout 
the life of the spacecraft. Whenever maneuvers required 
prolonged, low duty-cycle use of the ACS thrusters (i.e., 
less than 10%), elevated thruster temperatures could occur 
resulting in performance issues and possibly triggering 
another hydrazine detonation. Thus, thruster thermal issues 
eliminated the original North-South station-keeping plan, 
because it required extensive use of ACS thrusters at low 
duty-cycles. The loss of North-South inclination control at 
the beginning of life resulted in an abundance of unspent 
fuel at the end of life, which ultimately had to be disposed 
of as part of the TDRS-1 EOM activities.  
TDRS-1 experienced several anomalies over its service 
years, but continued to provide communication services in 
various roles. As inclination increased and additional TDRS 
were launched, TDRS-1 was assigned to the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) in 1989, primarily supporting 
South Pole stations. (Its high inclination provided good 
polar visibility.) NSF support lasted until 21 October 2009 
when the last of six traveling wave tube (TWT) assemblies 
wore out, precluding the satellite’s ability to transfer user 
data. All T&C was then supported via the low-bandwidth, 
S-band, omni antenna. Because of this inability to support 
users, TDRS-1 was decommissioned on 28 October 2009 
and subsequently moved to a temporary orbital slot of 
56.5 W longitude to await disposal. 
Challenges to Fulfilling the Orbital Debris Requirements 
TDRS-1 was not designed to meet current orbital debris 
requirements, but the EOM effort did satisfy all but one of 
the debris requirements defined by NASA-STD-8719.14 
Handbook for Limiting Orbital Debris [3]. The handbook 
defined two broad criteria: raising the orbit such that it 
would remain at or above GEO +200 km (35,986 km) 
altitude for a period of at least 100 years, and passivation of 
all stored energy sources. Using spacecraft system design 
manuals and schematics, a designated TDRS-1 EOM team 
implemented capabilities that were never envisioned in the 
original spacecraft design. Taking advantage of the 
abundance of fuel along with the multitudes of 
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configurations and ground-commanded cross-strap 
connections, procedures were developed to: 
(1) Raise altitude to a targeted 350 km above GEO. 
(2) Deplete fuel while maintaining the orbit approximately 
350 km above GEO (minimizing the impact of fuel 
depletion to the 350 km above GEO orbit proved very 
challenging).  
(3) Spin down the momentum wheel while maintaining 
attitude. 
(4) Permanently discharge the battery. 
(5) Permanently remove the battery from the bus. 
(6) Permanently turn off any RF radiation sources. 
(7) Permanently disable all active RF receivers. 
Pressurant passivation was the only orbital debris 
requirement that was not met because the propellant tank 
was designed with a diaphragm which prevented the 
nitrogen pressurant from being vented at EOM. A waiver 
was granted for this requirement. 
This paper describes the analyses, approaches, and on-orbit 
execution of these EOM activities. 
2. SUMMARY OF CONSTRAINTS AND OPTIONS 
CONSIDERED 
Key Constraints 
Delta Velocity Maneuver Burn Time—The TDRS-1 
thrusters were subject to a unique phenomenon (corrected 
on subsequent spacecraft) referred to as ―thruster choking.‖ 
Thruster choking reduces the flow of propellant through a 
thruster, both diminishing its control authority and also 
causing a rise in temperature because less heat is transferred 
away by the propellant flow. The condition limited TDRS-1 
thruster operations to 100 s or less for most of its 
operational life. A re-evaluation [4] determined that 600 s 
was a safe limit for TDRS-1 propulsion system conditions 
in delta-V mode. With an estimated 22 h of thruster burn 
time required to deplete the remaining propellant, the 10-
min burn constraint would dictate that 132 such burns be 
performed. A combination of thruster thermal diurnal 
variation and the optimal orbital position for burn execution 
(i.e., apogee or perigee) would further dictate that the burns 
be separated by 12 or 24 h.  
Qualification Limit of Thruster Burn Duration—The 
TDRS-1 thrusters had undergone ground qualification 
testing for a maximum duration of 3 h. While this was far in 
excess of the 600-s on-orbit burn limit, the qualification 
limit would become a factor as other fuel depletion 
approaches were considered. 
Eclipse Season—All TDRS-1 EOM activities were required 
to be completed before the start of the fall eclipse season, 
which began on 11 July 2010. Any TDRS-1 attitude 
recovery procedure would have involved use of a Sun-
pointing mode, which could have been impacted by an 
eclipse. In addition, as various fuel depletion modes were 
considered, positive electrical power balance also became a 
concern. 
Over-the-horizon (OTH) Operations—Ground sites other 
than the White Sands Complex (WSC) usually experienced 
significant command loss and telemetry dropouts when 
communicating with TDRS-1, because of lower uplink 
signal strength and/or less optimal ground site location. 
EOM activities were constrained to a direct link with WSC 
which effectively imposed a deadline on completion, 
because a westward longitudinal drift of TDRS-1 would 
begin as soon as its semi-major axis was increased above 
the geosynchronous value. Based on the nominal orbit-
raising plan, it was estimated that TDRS-1 would drift out 
of view to WSC (165°W sub-satellite longitude point) on 4 
July 2010. EOM had to be completed before this time. It 
was too high of a risk to allow the single event upset (SEU) 
susceptible TDRS-1 to drift completely around the Earth 
with spotty communications coverage and resume EOM 
operations as it drifted back into view from the East.  
Fuel Depletion Options Considered 
It was recognized early on that the first priority was raising 
the TDRS-1 orbit to a debris-compliant super-synchronous 
altitude. To minimize the risks during this phase of the 
EOM, the 600-s burn duration limit was adopted. 
Additionally, maneuvers began after the spring eclipse 
season ended and when thruster thermal conditions were 
more favorable. As a result of these constraints, orbit raising 
could not start until 5 June 2010 and would not complete 
until 13 June 2010. The remaining EOM activities, fuel 
depletion, and passivation were constrained to start after 
June 13
th
 and complete before TDRS-1 loss of view from 
WSC. This constraint heavily impacted the viability of the 
various fuel depletion options considered. Prior to orbit 
raising, TDRS-1 was estimated to have 139.47 kg of 
propellant. The orbit raising used 13.06 kg of propellant 
leaving an estimated 126.41 kg that needed to be depleted 
by fuel depletion activities. 
Delta Velocity Maneuvers—The most straightforward 
approach to fuel depletion was to consider maneuvers 
already used on TDRS-1 (East/West delta-velocity 
maneuvers) or used on other TDRS (North/South delta-
velocity maneuvers). East/West maneuvers, in particular, 
were a routine operation during the TDRS-1 mission. The 
time window available, due to the eclipse and OTH 
constraints combined with the 600-s burn duration 
constraint, eliminated East/West or North/South maneuvers 
as a viable option to achieve complete fuel depletion. 
Allowing for two 600-s burns per day would require over 60 
days to realize fuel depletion. This clearly exceeded the time 
window available. 
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Ground-commanded Thruster Firings—To better utilize the 
time window available, some thought was given to open-
loop thruster pulsing—an operation that would be similar to 
the routinely performed momentum unloads [5]. Given the 
depletion time window, this method would have required 
1098 command sequence transmissions per day, or 46/h. 
This approach was deemed operationally impractical, as it 
required near-continuous command activity for 
approximately 17 days in order to expend the remaining 
propellant. 
Propellant Venting from A-side Leak—Consideration was 
given to utilizing the ruptured A-side propulsion system [6] 
to deplete the fuel. This approach sought to vent hydrazine 
from each propellant tank into space by opening the 
isolation valve connecting that tank with the A-bank of 
thrusters. The approach was attractive because it depleted 
fuel with little or no impact to the orbit (due to the low exit 
velocity of the propellant through the leak), and it was an 
efficient method of removing propellant from the spacecraft 
(0.54 kg could be expended per minute). Given this rate, the 
total residual propellant mass could be removed with 
approximately 233 min of isolation valve open time. 
However, several unknowns about the leak and the valves 
were considered serious risks [5]. These unknowns 
included: the ability to control spacecraft attitude while 
hydrazine vented out the ruptured propellant line; the 
potential for hydrazine to freeze in the propellant line(s) and 
at the thruster valve; the ability of the isolation valves to 
support the required cycling; and the potential for fuel 
detonation in the propellant line due to the ―water hammer‖ 
effect. Ultimately, the risk was considered too great given 
the unknowns; any on-orbit testing could only be safely 
performed after reaching super-synchronous altitude thus 
posing a risk to the schedule. 
Z-spin—Another approach to deplete fuel was to fire the 
station-keeping thrusters (e.g., Z1 and Z2) while spinning 
the spacecraft about its Z-axis (see Figure 3). The thruster 
pair torques would approximately cancel each other while 
the spin would serve to stabilize attitude and average out 
most of the delta-velocity imparted to the orbit. The 
depletion burns could be performed without any active 
thruster attitude control thus eliminating the thruster 
choking issue (i.e., no thrusters operate in problematic duty 
cycle regions) that limited normal ∆v maneuver durations. 
Two orientations of the Z-axis were considered. 
(1) Z-spin, Sun-pointed—From an electrical power 
perspective, having the Z-axis Sun-pointed is an attractive 
orientation. The solar arrays can be positioned to receive 
full Sun continuously, similar to normal operations. The 
communications geometry would not always be favorable 
since the hemispherical omni antenna would spend half the 
orbit pointing away from Earth. Rather than lose 
communications for half an orbit, an attitude maneuver 
would need to be performed twice per orbit around 
spacecraft 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. to keep the omni in view of 
WSC. The maneuver would serve to pitch the spacecraft 
180°, maintaining good communication for the next half-
orbit and also slewing the solar arrays to maintain Sun 
pointing. These half-orbit maneuvers added operational 
complexity and also posed some risk of thruster choking 
while being executed.  
(2) Z-spin Orbit Normal—This Z-axis spin approach would 
orient the spacecraft +Z-axis in the direction of the orbit 
normal before introducing a negative spin rate. While solar 
array power input would be reduced and the 
communications link would operate near the edges of the 
omni antenna pattern, this approach was selected as the best 
compromise. A complete description is given in a following 
section. 
3. PLANNING, ANALYSES, AND SIMULATIONS 
Orbit Raising 
The highest priority was to remove the spacecraft from 
GEO. Successfully boosting the spacecraft to a sufficiently 
high altitude offered the potential of isolating the spacecraft 
such that TDRS-1 would not pose a significant risk to other 
spacecraft in the geosynchronous arc [7].  
Based upon guidance presented in NASA-STD-8719.14 [3], 
the minimum safe perigee for a spacecraft with TDRS-1’s 
physical properties (i.e., spacecraft area, mass, and 
reflectivity) was calculated to be 290 km above GEO (for 
the 100-year requirement). Given that the intent was to 
dispose of approximately 126 kg of hydrazine via thruster 
firings, once the disposal orbit altitude had been attained, 
the decision was made to target a perigee altitude of GEO 
plus 350 km. Although the methodology developed to 
execute the propellant disposal was intended to limit the 
effect upon the orbit, it was still anticipated that significant 
orbit lowering could occur.  
The increase in orbital altitude would require a change in 
velocity of 12.6 m/s, or a total burn duration of 7239 s. 
Given the constraints of the TDRS-1 thrusters, such a 
change in orbit was not a trivial undertaking. Prior to Fall 
2009, station-keeping maneuvers had been specifically 
limited to 100 s due to concerns about thruster performance 
during longer duration burns.
4
 Repositioning maneuvers of 
900, 480, and 320 s were performed in 1990, 1994, and 
1996 respectively. The requirement to de-orbit TDRS-1 
provided an impetus to re-examine this conservative 
limitation.  
The limitation of burn duration was based upon the 
assumption, and confirmed with empirical experience, that 
following burn termination a significant amount of thruster 
 
4 These concerns centered primarily around two TDRS-1 RCS limitations: 
1) the loss of the primary system and the negative roll thruster on the 
redundant system, due to thruster failures during the rescue mission (1983), 
and 2) the potential for the occurrence of thruster ―choking‖ during 
extended thruster operation. This phenomenon of choking had the effect of 
reducing thruster impulse by as much as 90%, thus seriously compromising 
attitude control during critical operations. 
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firing using hot thrusters was often required to dampen 
attitude errors and rates prior to transition to ACS Normal 
Mode (i.e., reaction wheel control) operation. An analysis of 
the 320 s duration burns executed in 1996 indicated, 
however, that given a sufficient amount of time in the burn 
(at least 6-7 min), the ACS control law would effectively 
dampen all attitude errors and rates. The attitude rates at 
burn termination would thus be effectively nulled, allowing 
for an immediate transition to Normal Mode operation with 
little or no thruster firings. The burn duration length was 
still limited by other spacecraft operational risks
5
, which 
dictated a need to allow for some thruster use capability at 
burn termination. The burns had to be of sufficient duration 
to allow for operation of the ACS control law to dampen 
attitude rates, but not long enough for thruster temperatures 
to become problematical for use following burn termination. 
Analysis of the 1996 relocation burns and subsequent 
simulation suggested that a burn duration of 10 min would 
be sufficient to achieve attitude error and rate damping 
while posing an acceptable level of operational risk. 
When TDRS-1 was decommissioned, the temporary move 
to the non-operational location (56.5ºW) provided an 
opportunity to validate the 600-s burn duration analysis.  
Accordingly, the two start drift/relocation burns were each 
10 min in duration and used the same thrusters planned for 
the final orbit raising. Attitude and thruster thermal 
performance during these burns validated the analysis. 
Based upon this performance, planning for the final orbit 
raising during TDRS-1 EOM projected the use of twelve 
10-min burns to achieve the necessary orbital velocity 
change. 
Selected Fuel Depletion Approach – Z-spin Orbit Normal 
Overview and Concerns—The Z-spin orbit normal 
configuration has the principal axis (i.e., maximum moment 
of inertia) spinning normal to the orbit plane. This option 
had the best combination of low risk, time to complete, 
minimal procedural complexity, and spacecraft stability. 
This approach did pose its own risks and concerns. 
However, sufficient planning time was available to 
adequately determine the risks and develop contingency 
approaches should those risks materialize. None of the 
possible risks were found to be insurmountable. The 
spacecraft systems concerns associated with the selected 
approach were: 
1) Would there be enough electrical power to operate the 
necessary spacecraft equipment in this configuration? The 
solar arrays would be fixed, relative to the spacecraft body, 
 
5 The TDRS-1 onboard processor memory was not hardened. As a 
consequence, it experienced periodic Single Event Upsets in RAM. An 
upset to a critical ACS control law parameter could be problematical during 
thruster control operations. There was also the potential for erratic gyro 
operation. Such anomalous operation occurred infrequently (three times 
during previous maneuver operations), but necessarily involved a 
requirement for manual correction of the situation (i.e., in this case, cycling 
gyro power).  
hence the power generating solar cells would be cycling in 
and out of sunlight. The arrays would be in effect generating 
approximately a third of their normal solar power.  
2) Would there be reliable, continuous space-to-ground 
communications through the omni antenna at a marginal 
orientation with respect to the ground station? Would there 
be combinations of body spin angle and orbital position 
(latitude) that could block the command and telemetry path? 
This was particularly worrisome because the spacecraft 
would need to receive commands every 51 s during the 
burns to continue firing the thrusters. Any burn interruption 
would result in an undesired attitude disturbance. 
3) Would the spacecraft be in an acceptable state of thermal 
balance? The unusual orientation relative to the Sun, the 
spinning motion, and the non-nominal suite of powered 
equipment required careful analysis. This issue was coupled 
with power concerns and an uncertainty in heater power 
consumption. 
4) Would Z-spin be dynamically stable while thrusting, and 
would operators have adequate knowledge of the inertial 
orientation of the angular momentum vector and be able to 
control it if required? The orientation of the angular 
momentum vector would not be directly measurable. The 
concern arose out of the fact that the Sun sensors on the 
solar arrays can measure the inertial orientation of the spin 
axis in only one direction (relative to the Sun). However, the 
clock-angle of the spin vector about the Sun line would not 
be directly measurable—thereby introducing an uncertainty 
in the knowledge of the tilt. 
This paper addresses all of these concerns, first from the 
perspective of planning and preparing for the EOM 
campaign followed by a report on the actual on-orbit 
performance results. 
Rotational Dynamics of Z-spin Orbit Normal Approach 
Analytical Discussion— The principal axes of a body are 
determined by the mass properties; the orientation is such 
that two of the axes are in direction of maximum and 
minimum moments of inertia. TDRS-1 is designed so that 
the principal axes are nearly aligned with the body axes with 
the largest moment of inertia very nearly aligned with the 
spacecraft Z-axis. A well-known property of spinning 
bodies is that rotation about the axis with the maximum 
moment of inertia is stable and will continue without change 
in the absence of external torques (i.e., between fuel 
depletion burns). Ideally then, performing a fuel depletion 
burn while spinning about the Z-axis will not cause the spin 
axis to change orientation in space. 
TDRS-1’s four Z-axis thrusters are shown in Figure 3. The 
Z-axis thrusters are used either in coupled pairs or 
individually for yaw attitude control, or in thrust pairs for 
∆v. Used in thrust pairs, they ideally would balance the 
torques generated about the spacecraft pitch, yaw and roll 
control axes resulting in a pure force through the spacecraft 
center of gravity. Actually, the torque cancellation is not 
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complete, leaving residual torques about two of the axes 
which will result in perturbations to the spin during the fuel 
depletion burns.  
A residual torque about the Z-axis will cause the spin speed 
to either decrease or increase. Therefore, adjustments to the 
spin speed would need to be made during the fuel depletion 
burn in order to keep the spin speed close to the desired rate.  
Spin speed adjustments could be made by off-modulating 
one of the two Z-axis thrusters resulting in a temporary 
imbalance of the thruster torques to correct the spin speed. 
Although the residual torque about roll is relatively small, 
the residual torque about the pitch is significant and will 
perturb the orientation of the spin vector. There are two 
effects of this external torque: nutation and precession.  
Nutation is the motion of a spinning body's principal axis 
about the angular momentum vector in inertial space. The 
nutation angle is the instantaneous angle between the 
principal axis and the angular momentum vector. Precession 
is the change in the direction of the angular momentum 
vector in inertial space and is always due to an external 
torque. 
In nutation, the body will spin/rotate faster than the spin 
axis nutates–—the exact ratio determined by the body mass 
properties. After a complete nutation period the spin axis 
retraces the motion in space, however, the body axes will 
differ from the previous nutation motion due to the 
difference between the spin rate and the nutation rate. For 
TDRS-1’s mass properties, this ratio is approximately 4:3—
after four spin periods and three nutation periods, the 
spacecraft body will return to almost the same position it 
was in at the beginning of the periods.  
If an applied external disturbance torque is constant 
throughout the many rotations, then the spin vector would 
experience a periodic combination of nutation and 
precession (the bounds determined by the size of the 
disturbance torque, the spin rate, and the ratio of the 
transverse products of inertia with the maximum inertia). 
Termination of the disturbance torque at the end of the burn 
will cease the periodic precession motion, but will cause the 
spin vector to start a different (i.e., torque-free) nutation 
path about the precessed mean orientation. 
Since the amount of nutation and precession resulting from 
a disturbance torque is inversely proportional to the spin 
rate, stability is better at a high rotation rate. However, if the 
spacecraft Z-axis tilt away from orbit normal is large, then 
the omni antenna view of the ground station will begin to be 
blocked by spacecraft structure at certain times of the day. 
In these situations, reacquiring a command link is more 
difficult at a higher spin rate. Simulations indicated that a 
spin rate of 1.0°/s was an acceptable compromise between 
spin stiffness and communications integrity. 
The final precession and residual nutation can be 
controlled/minimized by carefully timing the fuel depletion 
burns to end when nutation and spin have brought the Z-axis 
nearly back to where it was before the burn started. Thus, all 
fuel depletion burns were planned in increments of 4 spin 
periods (approximately 3 nutation periods). Because the 
selected spin rate was 1.0°/s, the burn durations were 
planned for multiples of approximately 24 min. The 
spacecraft body axes will not return exactly to the original 
position at the start of the burn. This offset will increase 
with each 24-min cycle, and will have a noticeable effect on 
residual nutation and precession with the long burns (>1 
hour) planned for the fuel depletion activity. 
  
Figure 3 – Orientation of Thrusters Relative to TDRS 
Reference Axes 
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Simulation of Dynamics—To predict attitude dynamic 
behavior, a computer model was developed that could 
simulate and display the motion of a rotating rigid body 
subject to thruster torques. Assuming that appendage 
flexibility and fuel slosh are negligible, the dynamics are 
governed by Euler’s equations for rigid body motion—
consisting of three non-linear scalar differential equations, 
one for each of the principal axes. The non-linearity is a 
consequence of the non-inertial body frame. In the 
simulation the equations are integrated to give angular rates 
as a function of time, based on inputs specified for each 
principal axis. The inputs included the moments of inertia, 
initial angular rate, and torque as a function of time. 
Multiplying the output for each axis by the corresponding 
principal moment of inertia gave the corresponding angular 
momentum component as a function of time in the body 
frame.  
It was also useful to transform body components of these 
and other vector quantities into inertial coordinates and vice 
versa. This required an additional set of differential 
equations that operated on the angular velocity time 
functions to produce coordinate transformations (a function 
of time) in the form of Euler parameters (quaternions).  
Their initial values, in effect, selects the inertial coordinate 
system; but for the most part, the two systems were made 
coincident at t=0. The results were then converted to 
directional cosine matrices.  
Because the solar torque, the dominant external disturbance 
at GEO, was significantly smaller than the torques from the 
thrusters, only torques from the two thrusters used, Z1 and 
Z2, were included. All the equations were programmed into 
MATLAB
®
 as a Simulink model.
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A globe of unit radius displayed on a MATLAB graphics 
window was generated to represent either a body or inertial 
frame of reference. Using spherical coordinates, time 
functions of vectors were normalized to unit magnitude and 
plotted on the globe’s surface. This provided insight when 
examining simulation results.  
Figure 4a shows the typical trajectory of the angular 
velocity and angular momentum in the body frame over a 
600-s thruster firing. The center of the coordinate system 
corresponds to the –Z principal axis. Markers indicate 1-min 
time intervals starting from the origin at t=0. At this time, a 
constant transverse torque along +Y was applied causing 
both the angular momentum and angular velocity to leave 
the origin and orbit counterclockwise from the center of the 
figure along offset elliptical trajectories that cycle in 8-min 
intervals (the nutation period). When the torque was 
removed at 600 s, both quantities switch to more 
 
6 Trade names and trademarks are used in this report for identification only. 
Their usage does not constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or 
implied by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
pronounced elliptical trajectories centered about the origin; 
this is torque-free body nutation. (Had the thrust continued 
six more minutes in this simulation case, the trajectory 
would have returned to the origin and the final nutation 
would have been near zero.) 
 
 Figure 4a – Typical Trajectories of the Angular Velocity 
and Angular Momentum in the Body Frame. 
Figure 4b shows the same case as Figure 4a, with angular 
momentum and the body –Z axis plotted in the inertial 
coordinate system coinciding with the body coordinates at 
t=0. Both quantities start at the origin. Note that the circular 
motion of the angular momentum orbits over a 6-min 
interval (the spin period). The –Z-axis direction coincides 
with the angular momentum direction every  
8-min (nutation cycle). This is indicated at the points where 
the cusps of the body Z-axis curve (Burn portion) touch the 
angular momentum path in Figure 4b. Also note that the 
post-burn angular momentum ceases to precess as shown by 
the marker on the angular momentum path at burn end in the 
same figure.  
 
Figure 4b – Typical Trajectories of the Angular 
Momentum and Body –Z (+ Spin) Axis in  
Inertial Coordinates 
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Impact on Super-synchronous Orbit 
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), Flight 
Dynamics Facility (FDF) evaluated the effect of fuel 
depletion burns in the Z-spin orbit normal orientation. The 
evaluation was divided into the effects of thrust components 
along the orbit normal and those in the orbit plane. 
Thrust in Orbit Plane—FDF evaluated the effect on 
apogee/perigee altitude of thrust deviation from orbit normal 
at two burn positions in the orbit, the ascending and 
descending orbit nodes. The thrust deviations from orbit 
normal were applied in each of four principle in-plane 
directions (separated by 90°). Only the in-plane thrust 
component was modeled, with its size defined by a thrust 
magnitude and the direction of the deviation from orbit 
normal. Thrust in the orbit normal direction was neglected. 
Off-pointing angles of 5° and 10° and burn durations of 1 
and 8 h were evaluated. Each of the tested directions 
produced a change in apogee/perigee heights. Figure 5 
shows the results for a 1-h burn with 10
o
 of off-pointing. 
The worst-case off-pointing direction lowered perigee by 
almost 20 km. The maximum change to either apogee or 
perigee was 2 km/h of thrusting per degree off orbit normal. 
The actual in-plane thrust was not sufficient to separate 
these effects from other assumption-related perturbations.  
Outcome—Due to the initial uncertainty of TDRS-1’s spin 
axis orientation it was decided to make the first burn at 
perigee. This minimized the chances of lowering the orbit 
before the spacecraft orientation could be determined. The 
apsis sensitivities discussed in the preceding paragraph 
coupled with the low predicted offset of the Z-axis from 
orbit normal before the first burn lent confidence to the 
approach of commencing the burns with one of 72 minutes 
duration.    
 
Figure 5 – One-hour Burn with 10° Off-pointing  
Propellant Estimate 
At the start of the orbit-raising operation, the estimated 
remaining hydrazine propellant was 139.47 kg. Of that total, 
66.60 kg was estimated to remain in Tank A and 72.87 kg in 
Tank B. Since there was no direct readout of remaining 
propellant mass on the spacecraft, these estimates were 
based upon approximately 27 years of methodical 
bookkeeping. Given that there were numerous sources of 
error for this method, not least of which was the fact that the 
on-board processor truncated the telemetered thruster on-
time, the expectation was that the estimates would only be 
accurate to within 10–20 kg.  
Tank Management 
Because of certain concerns relating to possible thruster 
performance during the final stage of fuel depletion
7
, the 
decision was made to manage tank usage carefully such that 
final depletion would occur on both tanks simultaneously. 
Thus, Tank A (the lower pressure tank) was selected as the 
initial tank on which fuel depletion operations would begin. 
Once the estimated mass in Tank A reached approximately 
20 kg, a switch would be made to Tank B, followed by a 
resumption of fuel depletion operations. At the point at 
which the estimated Tank B mass approximately equaled 
that in Tank A, both tanks would be configured to the 
thruster bank (i.e., both tank isolation valves opened), the 
tank pressures equalized, and fuel depletion operations 
resumed to completion.  
Tank Pressure Characteristics Near Depletion 
Introduction—The Z-spin approach required the careful 
orchestration of events while the tanks expended their last 
few kilograms of propellant. The Z-spin orientation needed 
to be maintained after ―depletion‖ to support the final 
passivation activities. This required that the final burn be 
terminated before complete depletion (since erratic thruster 
performance could cause an unrecoverable attitude 
disturbance), and also that sufficient propellant remained to 
perform nutation control as well as to de-spin the spacecraft 
to 0.5°/s. The EOM team needed a predictive 
characterization of tank pressure behavior as the final 
kilograms of propellant are forced out of the tanks in order 
to establish on-orbit burn stop criteria. To characterize the 
in-flight pressure changes that may occur when the two 
spacecraft tanks begin to empty of hydrazine, a test was 
performed on a spare TDRS tank at GSFC. 
Discussion—Test data showed that if the amount of gas 
trapped under the diaphragm due to hydrazine 
decomposition is insignificant, then there could be three or 
more minutes of available fuel flow from the start of rapid 
pressure decline until the flight tanks are depleted. This 
would provide sufficient response time to terminate the final 
depletion burn and avoid an attitude disturbance. Armed 
with this knowledge and assuming the gas trapped under the 
diaphragm was small but not zero, the White Sands EOM 
team planned the final depletion burn to terminate when the 
pressure decreased to 100 psi.  
 
7 The concern specifically related to the expectation that thruster 
performance could become erratic during this final stage of fuel depletion. 
That is, it was speculated that dissolved nitrogen gas, coming out of 
solution and into bubbles as tank pressure decreased, would begin to 
displace liquid hydrazine at the thruster injector valve. In a worst case 
scenario, such an effect could also damage the thrusters. In such an event, 
fuel depletion operations might have to be terminated. 
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Power Management 
The Z-spin orientation with fixed solar array positioning 
provided intermittent solar array power only. The focus of 
the electrical power planning was to anticipate an expected 
marginal power situation, given the reduced power and the 
mandatory bus loads required to operate the spacecraft. On-
orbit tests at GEO were conceived, e.g., rotating the arrays 
360
o
, which would have allowed characterization of the 
power subsystem in conditions similar to a Z-spin. The 
concern of stranding the spacecraft at GEO because of some 
anomaly during testing precluded their execution. Analysis 
was the only means available to help anticipate power 
management issues and plan work-around procedures. Of 
particular concern was charging batteries with the solar 
arrays paddle-wheeling in and out of the Sun, producing 
power similar to a half-wave rectified sine-wave. With a 6-
min spin period, a little less than 3 min was available for the 
solar arrays to recharge the batteries while supporting all 
critical bus loads. 
The spacecraft’s Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) was 
designed with a 37-volt (at 73 watts) high-rate battery 
charge solar array section, a 37-volt (at 16 watts) battery 
trickle-charge section, and a 25-volt (at 1700 watts) array 
section for bus and payload operation. With only 3 min 
available for battery recharge, it was clear that neither the 
trickle-charge nor the high-rate battery charge solar array 
sections would be sufficient to return the power removed 
during the 3-min out-of-Sun period. Routinely, the batteries 
are disconnected from the bus when Sun is on the array to 
allow the batteries to charge and float at a voltage higher 
than the bus (via the 37-volt battery charge sections). Since 
solar array voltage increases as the load current decreases 
and solar array voltage also increases with reduced solar 
array temperatures, it was hypothesized that the higher 
voltage and charge current necessary to charge the batteries 
could be attained from the 25-volt bus operations section of 
the array. With ―cool‖ solar arrays and sufficient load 
reduction, under this hypothesis, the spacecraft power 
operating point would move to a higher voltage operating 
point on the solar array IV (current-voltage) curve resulting 
in the 25- volt solar array section providing sufficiently high 
voltage to support battery charging.  
One difficulty in power planning resulted from the large 
uncertainty in end-of-life solar array degradation; no good 
assessment was possible to determine if the voltage 
necessary to recharge batteries could be provided from the 
25-volt solar array section. Using the limited on-orbit data, 
solar array IV curve analysis indicated that the 1700-watt 
array section operating at normal temperatures would not 
produce the voltage necessary for battery charging; but this 
analysis did not take into account the uncertainties of the 
expected solar array aging or lower solar array temperatures 
(from the paddle-wheeling of the arrays in the Sun). 
Another challenge in planning resulted from the equipment 
never having been shut off for the life of the spacecraft 
resulting in uncertainties in determining true bus unit 
electrical loads. The spacecraft power subsystem manual 
typically listed unit load demands on the high end. The lack 
of data, in combination with the problem in determining 
changes in unit/panel heater demands while in the flat spin, 
made it difficult to accurately characterize load savings. 
Uncertainty in the load assessment dictated the development 
of a flexible load shedding and modulation plan. Using a 
listing of non-critical loads sorted by estimated wattage, 
loads could be progressively shed or added, as needed. It 
was thought that loads would have to be shed down to the 
essential units from the likely limited array voltage available 
for battery charge. To track battery state-of-health during Z-
spin operations, a process was developed to integrate the 
battery charge/discharge currents and monitor individual 
cell voltages. In the unlikely event of higher than expected 
voltage from the solar array, a load modulation plan was 
also available in order to maintain the bus voltage within 
acceptable limits and avoid battery overcharge or 
undercharge.  
Despite the unknowns, the consensus was that the electrical 
power subsystem could be reasonably expected to support 
the Z-spin approach. A contingency procedure was available 
to command TDRS-1 to Sun mode and recharge the 
batteries in the event of abnormally low battery state-of-
charge, which would increase the operational complexity of 
the approach but was only needed as a contingency.  
A 20-hour period was allocated following the initiation of 
the Z-spin to achieve thermal equilibrium, evaluate 
subsystem performance, and allow an assessment of all the 
unknowns. 
Thermal Control 
The TDRS-1 thermal control system (TCS) was designed to 
maintain all spacecraft equipment within acceptable 
temperature limits throughout all mission phases. This was 
accomplished primarily by passive means utilizing 
combinations of thermal hardware, which included multi-
layer insulation, second surface mirror radiators, and 
thermal control coatings. These elements are supplemented 
by thermostatically-controlled heater circuits.  
The reaction control system (RCS) also utilized 
thermostatically controlled heaters located on the propellant 
feed lines, propellant tanks, dual thruster module (DTM) 
valves, fill and drain module (FDM), and the propellant 
distribution module (PDM) in order to maintain propellant 
temperatures above freezing (4.4°C).  
In support of the TDRS-1 EOM, the TDRS-3 Thermal Math 
Model (TMM) was modified to represent the TDRS-1 
configuration. The TDRS-1 thermal model was then 
correlated to TDRS-1 October 2009 and March 2010 flight 
data. To account for differences between the TDRS-1 and 
TDRS-3 thermal model configurations, several 
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modifications were made to properly represent the 
propellant thrusters, thermal coating properties, multi-layer 
insulation (MLI) degradation, and the NiCd battery 
radiators. 





 (Earth-pointing) thermal model to obtain good 
correlation between the TDRS-1 thermal model and flight 
data. The temperature comparison data for the positive pitch 
thrusters shown in Figure 6 is typical of how well the 
thermal model predications correlate to the flight 
temperatures. This comparison was done for the thrusters, 
batteries, propulsion tanks, solar arrays, and other 
temperature critical payload and spacecraft components 
needed to support the EOM planning. 
  
Figure 6 – Thruster P1A Temperature Correlation 
The correlated TDRS-1 thermal model was then used to 
predict temperatures for the Z-spin configuration. The 
predicted Z-spin temperature results were used to determine 
whether any of the critical spacecraft component 
temperatures would violate qualification or acceptance 
limits. Figure 7 shows a sample temperature prediction for 
the spacecraft panel supporting critical communication 
electronics. 
 
Figure 7 – Communication Panel Temperature 
Predictions 
 
8 Trade names and trademarks are used in this report for identification only. 
Their usage does not constitute an official endorsement, either expressed 
or implied by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
A joint effort between WSC and GSFC Sustaining 
Engineering teams to develop the spacecraft electronic and 
heater power tables (Table 1) was significant in establishing 
the TDRS-1 power dissipation assumptions used for thermal 
model temperature predictions.  
Furthermore, this power dissipation data along with the 
thermal model predictions provided valuable insight into the 
heater power duty-cycle estimate that was critical in 
estimating the overall power balance during the Z-spin 
orientation. 
Table 1 – TDRS-1 EOM  
Z-spin power dissipation summary 
 
Telemetry and Command Communication Issues 
TDRS-1 was equipped with a mast-mounted, omni-
directional, S-band antenna for use during launch and in-
orbit contingencies. This antenna has its bore sight offset 
21° from the Z-body axis in the Y-Z plane. An antenna 
pattern measured on a quarter-scale model during 
development ground testing showed the omni antenna 
pattern to be approximately 265° in width, centered on the 
bore sight (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8 – Omni Antenna Coverage Pattern 
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This pattern, coupled with the omni bore sight offset, meant 
that when a Z-spin is perfectly oriented to the orbit normal, 
communications via this antenna would be marginal once 
per revolution because the edge of the antenna null swept 
past the Earth. Analysis of the spacecraft dynamics during a 
modeled burn showed that a certain amount of nutation 
during thrusting was inevitable making it uncertain whether 
the T&C coverage would be available to send the 
continuous stream of commands required for fuel depletion 
burns.  
A continuous command stream was of particular importance 
since the dynamics during fuel depletion required 
continuous burns for an integral number of spacecraft 
rotations to avoid disrupting or tilting the orbit normal spin 
axis. Good windows of T&C coverage following the burns 
were also important for providing the ranging data critical 
for accurate post-burn orbital solutions. Simulated 
spacecraft fuel depletion burn modeling provided insight, 
but true results would not be known until the omni antenna 
was utilized in the spinning attitude. To characterize the 
quality of the space-to-ground link through the antenna as 
well as provide real-time insight into disturbance of the orbit 
normal spin axis, it was planned to monitor the ground 
receiver’s signal strength (Automatic Gain Control, AGC), 
on-board receiver signal strength, and telemetry dropouts. 
It was thought that a 24-h plot of the on-board received 
signal strength and ground receiver AGC could be used to 
indicate the magnitude and plane of the Z-axis tilt with 
sufficient precision to allow for Z-axis precession 
maneuvers to remove the tilt as needed. Patterns in the 24-h 
plot of on-board received signal strength and ground 
receiver AGC supported this belief but it was never 
validated since FDF thrust vector solutions provided 
sufficient insight for the Z-spin axis tilt adjustment. 
4. ON-ORBIT CAMPAIGN AND PERFORMANCE 
RESULTS 
Preparations and Organization 
Introduction—The early failure signature on the last 
operational SGL downlink TWT initiated the beginning of 
TDRS-1 EOM preparations. A TDRS-1 End-of-Mission 
Integrated Mission Plan (IMP) document [8] captured the 
diverse products that would be required to execute the EOM 
campaign. The IMP contained: 
(1) EOM requirements, procedure objectives, and 
protocols. 
(2) Organizational, management, and staffing structure. 
(3) EOM ground resource management.  
(4) EOM activity flowchart. 
(5) Notional planning schedule. 
(6) Executable Command Plans (nine sections).  
(7) Flight rules. 
(8) Contingency plans. 
Flight Rules—Flight rules were created to establish pre-
determined decisions and operational boundaries which 
address safety, risk mitigation, and overall practicality based 
upon mutual agreements between NASA centers (WSC, 
GSFC, and JSC) to guide the conduct of TDRS-1 EOM 
activities. Flight rules were also mapped to the TDRS-1 
EOM requirements in [3]. The Flight rules addressed: 
(1) Orbit-raising: Defined OTH resources and alternatives 
for failure needed to reach the targeted GEO+350 
kilometers. 
(2) OTH Contingency Support: Allocated ground 
resources and limited types of OTH operations to orbit 
raising and passivation only. 
(3) Fuel Depletion: Set limits on unintended perigee 
height-lowering, and fuel-depletion-time limits to 
OTH minus 3 days. 
(4) Operating Time Constraints: Set goal to complete all 
requirements while in WSC station view. Since orbit 
raising left TDRS-1 in a non-geosynchronous orbit 
with a 4.6°/d drift rate, time to complete fuel depletion 
and equipment passivations, was limited.  
(5) Isolation-Valve-Opening Constraints: Established 
constraints on operation of A-side propulsion system 
isolation valve to reduce the risk of resulting total 
impulse lowering perigee height 
(6) Spacecraft Power Management: Established maximum 
battery depth-of-discharge limits, and minimum 
battery voltage. 
(7) Thermal Management: Established EOM thermal 
limits for the remaining active spacecraft equipment.  
(8) Equipment Passivation: Provided for passivation via 
alternative OTH stations. 
(9) TDRS-1 EOM versus TDRS Fleet Contingency: 
Established response. 
(10) Orbit Determination Requirements: Defined orbital 
determination fidelity and frequency for orbit-raising 
and fuel depletion. 
(11) Ground Hardware and Software Management: 
Constrained hardware and software modifications 
during EOM for operational consistency. 
(12) Flight-Rule Conflict Arbitration: Established a 
management protocol for flight-rule conflicts and 
exceptions. 
Key Teams and Facilities—Two teams were used for TDRS 
1 EOM.  
The White Sands Complex team, located at White Sands, 
NM was composed of the EOM lead, flight directors, lead 
ACS, systems test conductors, a flight support team, and 
EOM systems engineers. The WSC team had two 
separately-located elements; one included the test conductor 
and his team of satellite controllers and systems/ACS 
engineers; the other was composed of flight dynamics and 
systems engineers. 
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The GSFC team, located at Greenbelt, MD was composed 
of NASA Management, FDF (providing orbit determination 
after each maneuver), Conjunction Assessment groups 
(providing comprehensive orbital debris tracking), and 
collision assessment and discipline engineering expertise. 
Orbit-Raising—Summary of Results  
The initial estimate of orbit-raising burn durations did not 
take into account expected loss of station-keeping 
thruster-on-time as a consequence of attitude control 
thruster firings, which interrupted the station-keeping 
thrusters. Subsequent analysis [7] indicated that an 
additional 30 s would be required with each maneuver. 
Further analysis also indicated that the additional burn 
duration would present no significant increase in risk to the 
conduct of the maneuver. Thus, as executed, all twelve 
orbit-raising burns were 630 s in duration. 
There was a gradual drop-off in achieved versus targeted 
drift rate over the 12 orbit-raising maneuvers. Starting with 
an underperformance of 1.05% for the first burn, the delta 
drift rate progressively declined to 6.31% for the last burn. 
Two key factors that contributed to the decline in achieved 
versus targeted drift rates were: first, the progressive 
increase in the negative yaw thruster duty-cycle  for reasons 
related primarily to the increasing difficulty in controlling 
pre-maneuver roll/yaw momentum; and secondly, the 
gradual drop-off in station-keeping thruster force 
consequent to a gradual decline in propellant tank pressure.  
In terms of the overall results (targeted versus achieved), the 
final drift rate was approximately 3.75% less than planned  
(-4.54°/d versus -4.72°/d). The final perigee altitude (above 
GEO) was approximately 3.98% less than targeted (351.72 
km versus 366.30 km). Figure 9 shows the apogee and 
perigee history over the course of the orbit-raising burns 
through the fuel depletion burns.  
 
Figure 9 – TDRS-1 Altitude History for Orbit-raising 
and Fuel Depletion Burns 
Propellant Summary—Based on propellant flow-rate 
calculations along with actual burn time, it was 
estimated that 144.88 kg of propellant was expended 
starting with orbit raising through spacecraft shutdown.  
Accounting for the estimated residual propellant of 1.6 kg 
remaining in the tank and lines, the estimated propellant 
mass of 139.47 kg at the start of EOM was in error by 7.01 
kg. 
 
Given that the total propellant mass, loaded prior to launch, 
was 597.83 kg; the discrepancy in estimated remaining 
propellant mass works out to an error in propellant mass 
bookkeeping of approximately 1.2% over 27 years. 
Roll Maneuver and Z-Axis Spin-Up 
In order to point the spacecraft Z-axis to orbit normal, a 
positive roll maneuver was required. Upon completion of 
the orbit-raising ∆v maneuvers and after settling into the 
normal Earth-pointing orientation, ground operators 
commanded the spacecraft into an inertial hold mode using 
gyroscopes and thrusters. The operators rolled the spacecraft 
90° by using a combination of the positive roll thruster and 
the yaw thrusters to accelerate and decelerate the roll rate. 
(There was a combination of yaw thrusters which had net-
zero yaw torque, but provided an effective negative roll 
torque.) The maneuver, practiced several times on a 
spacecraft simulator, was accomplished without significant 
incident.  
Based on simulations, on-orbit maneuvers, and gyro 
accuracy, it was predicted that the Z-axis would be within 
1° of orbit normal following the roll maneuver. The Z-axis 
was now pointed northward and normal to the orbit plane. 
After a relatively short period which allowed the spacecraft 
to settle into its new orientation and an assessment of its 
state of health, the operators disabled all onboard attitude 
control modes and commanded a sequence of yaw thruster 
firings to spin-up the vehicle about the negative Z-axis to 
approximately 1.0°/s. Careful thought was given to the 
method used to spin the spacecraft up without introducing 
unnecessary (and not fully measurable) tilt away from orbit 
normal. The spin-up was performed in two steps: the first 
step was to spin the vehicle up to 0.5°/s. There was a pause 
sufficient for the vehicle to complete one-half of a rotation 
about the Z-axis. Then the operators command the second 
step up in spin rate. It was shown by simulations during the 
planning phase that this two-step approach would leave a 
minimal residual nutation and would add, at most, 0.4° to 
the offset from orbit normal. Spacecraft performance again 
matched simulation performance.  
Nutation could not be directly measured, but could be 
inferred by recognizing that the transverse momentum that 
rotates in space due to nutation will cause the pitch and roll 
rates to cycle in quadrature. In fact, the magnitude of 
transverse momentum is constant and defined by the 
product of the peak pitch rate multiplied by the pitch inertia, 
which is equal to a similar calculation using roll rate and 
inertia. The nutation angle is defined by the ratio of the 
transverse momentum magnitude to the spin momentum. 
 13 
Thus monitoring the peak pitch and roll rates is equivalent 
to monitoring the nutation angle. 
After completing the spin-up, the operators observed a very 
minor nutation (~0.6° with an 8-min period) from the gyro 
roll and pitch rates (Figure 10a) thereby validating the two-
step spin-up approach suggested by the analytic simulation. 
No further action was necessary. 
Torque-Free Rotational Dynamics 
During the nearly 20-hour post spin-up observation period, 
the spacecraft rotation established about the Z-axis was 
stable and unchanging, as was predicted by analysis and 
simulation. This was established by monitoring two 
parameters: the spin rate of rotation and the nutation angle. 
The first parameter was measured directly using data from 
the spacecraft gyros. It did not change over the observation 
period.  
The second parameter, nutation angle, was inferred from the 
gyro data as discussed earlier. A comparison of the derived 
rate plots taken at the end of the spin-up and prior to the first 
fuel depletion burn (Figures 10a and 10b) indicated that the 
nutation angle decreased by approximately 6% over the 
observation period. This can be explained by spacecraft 
structural- or fuel-damping. 
Power Management On-Orbit Performance 
During the planned 20-hour period allocated for evaluation 
of subsystem performance, it became obvious that the solar 
array voltage and current output was well in excess of that 
necessary to maintain battery state-of-charge during the  
Z-spin. In addition, the solar heating resulting from the flat 
spin kept all spacecraft surfaces sufficiently warm, such that 
no heater loads were required. 
However, a potentially damaging overcharge situation now 
had to be addressed. To avoid battery damage, 
predetermined loads that were originally shed in anticipation 
of a marginal power condition were progressively turned 
back on to stabilize battery charging to a safe level. 
Unfortunately, the algorithm that was developed to help 
support battery management by tracking battery 
charge/discharge balance was unable to accurately integrate 
the charge and discharge current due the 32-s telemetry 
sample rate combined with a 6-min spacecraft rotation rate. 
This reduced the accuracy of the calculations and also 
resulted in an aliasing effect due to the periodicity of the 
data. Battery voltage and individual cell voltages were used 
as state-of-charge indicators instead of using the originally 
planned charge-discharge ratio in combination with the 
composite of cell voltages. Benign spacecraft loads were 
cycled as necessary in order to maintain stable and safe 
battery voltages. Cell voltages on Battery 3 began diverging 
somewhat high after several days into fuel depletion, 
indicating slight overcharge, but all 24 cells remained within 
an acceptable range. As a precaution against excessive 
battery overcharge to Battery 3 during the final shutdown 
sequence (when loads have to be turned off), the shutdown 
sequence was altered to end with Battery 1 (the lowest state-
of-charge battery) on-line instead of the planned Battery 3. 
 
Figure 10a – Nutation Cycle After Spin-up  
 
Figure 10b – Nutation Cycle Prior to First Fuel  
Depletion Burn 
Fortunately, the net power balance (one of the most 
potentially complicating conditions to the primary fuel 
depletion approach) was easily managed. It is worth noting 
that the extensive preparation made by identifying, 
classifying, and quantifying loads to achieve minimum 
power proved to be time well spent, as it served as the basis 
for incrementally applying loads to control charge.  
Thermal Subsystem On-Orbit Performance 
The TDRS-1 TMM proved to be a valuable tool for 
predicting temperatures and heater power estimates for 
different TDRS-1 electronic power, heater power and orbit 
configurations. The TDRS-1 thermal subsystem 
performance throughout the EOM phase was as predicted. 
Figure 11 shows the very close match between the solar 
array’s predicted versus actual temperatures for the Z-spin.  
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The Z-spin orbit normal flight temperatures obtained during 
the TDRS-1 EOM also verified that critical components 
(i.e., transponder, RCS, EPS, and batteries) for the TRW-
series TDRS spacecraft can be maintained above 
qualification limits and utilize minimum heater power when 
in this orientation. 
 
Figure 11–Solar Array Z-spin Temperature Comparison 
Telemetry and Command On-Orbit Performance 
The first four fuel depletion burns were relatively T&C 
dropout-free with the Z-axis oriented within 4° of orbit 
normal according to FDF thrust vector solutions. From 
Burn–5 through the completion of fuel depletion burns, 
T&C became increasingly intermittent because of the 
growing Z-axis tilt—which approached 8°. The telemetry 
signal-strength pattern followed a superposition of the 
spacecraft’s rotation, nutation, and precession originating 
from the fuel depletion attitude perturbations (Figure 12). 
As fuel depletion proceeded, the on-board received signal 
strength and telemetry dropout patterns were trended. This 
data indicated that as the Z-axis tilt increased, a combination 
of the SGL antenna feed and C-band antenna feed occulted 
the omni resulting in an increased number of T&C dropouts. 
For the most part, the dropouts were 1 or 2 s long with 
occasional dropouts on the order of 10 s. None of the 
dropouts impacted burns. The C-band feed is fixed (residing 
on the same boom as the omni), but the SGL antenna 
resided on a gimbaled arm that was parked slightly above 
the spacecraft body/face. The SGL antenna was lowered by 
nearly 10° (approximately 0.40 m) with the thought that it 
could only improve T&C. After the change, the overall the 
number and duration of dropouts remained essentially 
unchanged. 
The team concluded that the C-band antenna feeds (in 
combination with Z-axis tilt) were the primary dropout 
contributors. With sufficiently tight management of the 
nutation angle, the tilt of the angular momentum from orbit 
normal, and an ability to take advantage of the good daily 
communication periods, T&C dropouts did not interrupt any 
of the fuel depletion burns and had little impact to the 
mission. 
Fuel Depletion Burns On-orbit Performance 
A series of 10 fuel depletion burns were executed as part of 
the TDRS-1 EOM campaign. Table 2 summarizes the burn 
parameters. All but one of the fuel depletion burns were 
executed near perigee to minimize the impact of the burn 
upon perigee altitude. Previous analysis had determined that 
perigee must remain 290 km above GEO to meet orbital 
debris requirements. The maximum perigee decrease for a 
burn was 3.5 km resulting from Burn–5.  
 
Figure 12 – Received Signal Strength Telemetry
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Table 2 – Summary of Fuel Depletion Burns 
 
*This angle is measured in the orbit plane.
The final orbit achieved was 341 by 531 km above GEO and 
satisfied the prescribed EOM altitude requirements. The 
burn durations were determined by the time required to 
complete a pre-determined number of spacecraft revolutions 
and followed a gradual build up from a nominal 72 minutes 
to near the 3 hr qualification limit. This allowed confidence 
to be gained and enabled control of the post-burn position of 
the angular momentum vector. The amount of time required 
to complete revolutions varied with the actual spin rate, 
which itself varied during the burns. 
Table 2 also shows the magnitude and orientation of the 
inertial v resulting from the burns. These parameters were 
obtained as a product of the orbit determination process. 
Some inertial ∆v is observed because the thrusters had a 
component of their thrust aligned with the Z-axis which was 
not cancelled by the spin. In addition, spacecraft nutation 
can result in variation of thruster inertial pointing. As 
designed, the inertial ∆v realized during the Z-axis normal 
spin-mode was well below the approximately 155 m/s 
available, given the amount of propellant expended and the 
thruster’s specific impulse. The ∆v angle from orbit normal 
was controlled throughout the burns to less than 9
o
 offset. 
This was accomplished by controlling burn stop-time, the 
nutation angle, and by precession maneuvers to realign the 
angular momentum closer to orbit normal. A more complete 
discussion of these techniques follows. 
Post-burn Nutation Management 
Ground operators were generally successful in ending the 
fuel depletion burns at nearly the ideal time that would 
minimize the residual nutation, which continued in the 
torque-free situation that followed. Nonetheless, each burn 
did end with some small nutation, which was minimized 
before the next burn. The classical technique for damping 
nutation is to fire a thruster that provides a torque normal to 
the momentum vector. A pitch thruster was selected for use 
on TDRS1 because both polarities were available (versus 
constraint on using only the positive roll thruster). 
As discussed earlier, firing the thrusters while the spacecraft 
is rotating will cause both nutation and precession. 
Simulations found that firing the positive pitch thruster in 
three equal sets of burn-times—each spaced by one nutation 
period—were successful in reducing nutation without 
precessing the angular momentum vector. This technique 
was utilized at the end of each fuel depletion burn 
(Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13 – Example of Nutation Damping in Three 
Pitch-thruster Firings to Minimize Precession Inertial 
Motion of Z-axis and Angular Momentum Vector 
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Minimizing the Z-axis offset from orbit normal was 
desirable so that the thrust components along the Z-axis (the 
cant of the Z thruster pairs add a velocity component, 
sin 17
o
, in the +Z body direction) would not adversely affect 
the orbit and T&C coverage. Applied along the orbit 
normal, itself, these components would only serve to raise 
or lower the orbital inclination which did not impact 
requirement compliance. The Z-spin characterization period 
following initial spin-up reinforced the assumption that the 
Z-axis was some small angle from orbit normal as the T&C 
link quality was consistent around the orbit and coarse sun 
sensors (CSS) readings agreed with beta angle values. 
Fuel Depletion Burns—The basic strategy for executing the 
burns while maintaining near orbit normal pointing relied 
upon understanding the path that the angular momentum 
vector would follow while the spacecraft was thrusting. 
Simulations had shown, see Figure 4b, the angular 
momentum would follow a circular path in inertial space 
returning near to its origin (position at burn start) every spin 
period. By restraining the burn durations to be integral 
numbers of spin periods (and nutation periods to bring the 
Z-axis back near the origin as well) net angular momentum 
vector travel resulting from the burn was minimized. The 
nutation and spin periods were approximately a 4:3 ratio 
with a least-common-period of approximately 24 min (four 
spin periods). 
Angular momentum vector movement relative to the orbit 
normal was minimized but not eliminated through the 
execution of the series of burns due to achievable accuracy 
in terminating the burns and differences in individual 
thruster performance. On orbit characterization of the two 
thrusters used, Z1 and Z2 had already revealed a thrust 
performance difference of approximately 3%.  
Fortunately a disturbance torque compensation (DTC) 
feature of the spacecraft allowed for a simple memory load 
to effect off-modulation of the higher performing thruster. It 
was observed during the very first fuel depletion burn that 
adjustments to the DTC were required to maintain the spin 
rate near its nominal 1°/s value. As this pattern of spin rate 
variation continued over the next few burns it became 
apparent individual thruster performance was changing 
during the burns enough to affect the dynamics. The most 
noticeable single event occurred at the beginning of Burn–4 
when the spin rate changed by 0.017°/s over a 19-s period. 
While on-orbit execution of the fuel depletion burns was 
subject to this non-simulated effect, it is worth noting the 
on-orbit inertial motion of the Z-body unit vector generally 
followed the path predicted by the dynamic simulations. 
Compare the simulation (Figure 4b) with the flight data 
(Figures 14a-d), which were produced by processing TDRS-
1 gyro outputs [9]. The same can be noted for the angular 
momentum path, inferred in Figure 14a by connecting the 
cusps of the Z-body path. A great deal of the success of the 
fuel depletion burns is due to the accuracy of the dynamic 
simulations in predicting the behavior of the spacecraft 
rotational dynamics.  
The variations in individual thruster performance served to 
walk the angular momentum vector around in inertial space 
in an unpredictable manner contributing to the variations of 
the ∆v from orbit normal shown in Table 2.  
Burn Planning and Evaluation 
The initial two fuel depletion burns were planned for 
nominal durations of 72 min. A conservative approach was 
taken for Burn–1, which centered the burn about perigee to 
minimize any potential burn impacts to perigee height. This 
provided a ―coarse‖ burn start time of perigee passage 
minus 36 min (the ―fine‖ burn start time also takes into 
account the spin phase). An observation made from the 
dynamic simulations—discussed previously—found that the 
angular momentum vector will follow a repetitive circular 
path during the burn that is biased off from the origin in a 
predictable direction. The net effect would be to realize a tilt 
from the origin of the ∆v applied equal to the angular radius 
of the angular momentum path; the Z-body axis is also 
rotating about this point but in a much more complex path. 
It was desirable to align the ∆v tilt in the same direction as 
the spacecraft’s velocity vector so as to increase orbital 
energy, and apogee height, rather than the opposite. An 
inertial reference point was needed during a spin period to 
precisely determine the ―fine‖ burn start time such that the 
correct tilt of the ∆v would be achieved. The spacecraft’s 
CSSs were capable of providing just such a reference. The 
CSSs were placed on the outer corners of the solar arrays 
and designed to provide pitch and yaw inputs for the 
spacecraft’s Sun mode. However because of the Z-spin 
orientation, the CSS’s yaw reading crossed through zero as 
the array normal pointed in the Sun direction. By defining a 
phase angle offset from the CSS yaw ascending zero 
crossing and starting the burn at that point in the spin, the 
proper orientation of the ∆v tilt was achieved. The initial 
results were encouraging as both apogee and perigee heights 
were increased.  
Burn–2 was centered on the descending node. Poor T&C 
link quality had been observed during the first burn, and it 
was thought the descending node might provide a better 
space-to-ground geometry. Burn–2’s T&C link quality did 
not noticeably improve so subsequent burns returned to the 
near-perigee strategy. Burn–2’s ∆v tilt was again properly 
aligned increasing both apogee and perigee. Since the angle 
from orbit normal had grown to 2.3
o
, a decision was made to 
align the tilt of the ∆v opposite to the spacecraft velocity 
vector for Burn–3 in expectation of reducing the angle from 
orbit normal, and to accept some potential lowering of 
perigee. This strategy proved successful as the angle from 
orbit normal was reduced to 1.5
o
 while only lowering 
perigee by 900 m. Burn–4, the longest planned to date at 
192 min, returned to the nominal strategy of aligning the ∆v 
tilt in the same direction as the spacecraft’s velocity 
approximately centered around perigee. This burn resulted 






Figure 14a – Z-axis and Angular Momentum Vector 
Trajectories from Burn Start 
 
Figure 14c – Z-axis Trajectory from Burn Start  
+120 min to 184 min 
 
Figure 14 b – Z-axis Trajectory from Burn Start  
+60 min to 138 min 
 
Figure 14d – Z-axis Trajectory Near Burn Termination 
 
Subsequent analysis has shown the angular momentum 
vector motion had wandered from its predicted path due to 
an initial thruster performance transient and continuing 
thruster variations during the course of the burn (Figures 
14a through 14d). Burn–5 returned to the strategy 
implemented for Burn–3 with the intent of reducing the  
4.3
o
 tilt from orbit normal. However, the strategy proved 
unsuccessful as the angle from orbit normal was increased 
to 8.1
o
. It is suspected that thruster variations once again  
had allowed the angular momentum vector to follow an 
erratic path.  
Both Burn–6 and Burn–7 were executed with the nominal 
strategy used for Burn–2 and Burn–4. While the angle from 
orbit normal remained above 7
o
, the changes to apogee and 
perigee were acceptable. The final three burns (8, 9, and 10) 
retained the nominal strategy but were preceded by 
precession maneuvers that sought to reduce the angular 
momentum vectors tilt from orbit normal. There was 
concern that final passivation could be impacted by a large 
tilt angle, so precession was used to mitigate this risk. The 




FDF Support of Fuel Depletion Burns 
The GSFC FDF provided predictive spacecraft acquisition 
data before each burn and a post-burn spacecraft state and a 
best-fit impulsive ∆v following each burn.  
Orbit Determination—The post-burn state was determined 
using the Goddard Trajectory Determination System, a 
batch least-squares orbit determination program. About six 
hours of tracking was used for each solution, including T&C 
range measurements from WSC and range/Doppler 
measurements from other ground stations.  
Maneuver Modeling—It was assumed that the fuel depletion 
maneuvers could be modeled as an impulsive ∆v. The 
maneuvers were long enough to be noticeably non-
impulsive, but the resulting error was found acceptable. It 
was further assumed that the impulsive ∆v would be the 
same for consecutive maneuvers. Though the maneuver 
direction did vary noticeably, the variation was sufficiently 
small between maneuvers for these assumptions to be useful 
in planning burns. The best-fit impulsive ∆v for each burn 
was determined by minimizing the total position difference 
between a definitive post-maneuver ephemeris and pre-
maneuver vector with the delta-V applied. 
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Z-Axis Precession Maneuvers 
Through the course of the fuel depletion burns, it became 
evident from the orbit determination trends that the 
orientation of the Z-axis was drifting.  
During the burns, variations in individual thruster 
performance were causing the angular momentum to precess 
away from its position at burn start along an irregular path 
that did not return to the starting position. This was also 
evident in the effective orientation of the thrust vector—
inertial v angle from orbit normal—at the subsequent 
burns. See Table 2. As the tilt became larger, a decision was 
made to precess the Z-axis back toward orbit normal. The 
following discusses the two parts of the planning for 
precession maneuvers: the technique and the spatial timing. 
Technique—As discussed above, external torques acting on 
a rotating body will affect spin speed, nutation, and 
precession of the spin axis. Just as a technique was found 
that adjusts nutation without affecting precession, what was 
needed here was the converse. Again using the analytic 
simulation, it was found that spacing a pair of thruster 
firings two spin periods apart (i.e., two rotations)—as 
opposed to one nutation period for nutation control—would 
result in a desired change in precession, but leave minimal 
residual nutation. 
Spatial Timing—One of the outputs from the orbit 
determination activity was to place the effective V 
direction, and by inference the Z-axis tilt, in inertial space 
referenced to the Sun direction. Again, the decision was 
made to use the positive pitch thruster to provide the torque 
to precess the Z-axis. The next problem was to determine 
when the pitch axis was going to align with the spin tilt. The 
same technique that was used to determine burn start time 
within a spin period was applied. Given that there is no 
direct measurement of the orientation of the spin axis in 
space, there is the knowledge of when the solar arrays are 
pointed at the Sun, which can be a useful reference point.  
With excellent knowledge of the spin rate, the spatial 
orientation of the body axes can be inferred at any time 
relative to those Sun crossings. The procedure was to then 
issue thruster commands at approximately the time 
following the Sun crossing when the positive pitch thruster 
was opposed to the Z-axis tilt. 
There were three precession maneuvers. The first two 
provided a small adjustment to validate the technique. The 
last one was more aggressive in righting the spin axis and 
consisted of three sets of back-to-back precession 
commands. While there were no direct observables of the 
angular momentum precession, Figures 15a and 15b shows 
plots of actual spacecraft derived roll and pitch rates during 
the last precession adjustment.  
Figure 15a shows the initial small nutation; then an increase 
of nutation after the first firing of a pitch thruster (when the 
spin phase is such that the pitch thruster is aligned for the 
desired precession), and then a reduction in the nutation 
following the second thruster firing when the roll rate was 
near zero. This was repeated for a total of three firing pairs. 
 
Figure 15a – Derived Body Rates During Precession 
Adjustment 
 
Figure 15b shows a rate plot for the same data. The figures 
show the effectiveness of the technique in leaving the 
system with very low nutation. The reduction in reported v 
tilt in the succeeding fuel depletion burn confirmed that the 
maneuver achieved the desired effect. 
 
Figure 15b – Body Rates During Precession Adjustment 
Tank Depletion 
An assumption that the quantity of hydrazine decomposition 
gases trapped under the TDRS F-1 fuel tank diaphragms 
was small proved to be correct and the pressure was blown 
down to 100 psia without first depleting hydrazine. Figure 
16 shows the hydrazine-side pressure signature as the two 
tanks began to deplete. 
A rapid drop in the tank pressure is the signature of fuel 
tank depletion. Each of the two fuel tanks was a 1-m 
diameter ellipsoid with a flexible rubber radial ribbed 
diaphragm separating the nitrogen pressurant from the fuel.  
As fuel is removed from the tank, less liquid is available to 
displace the diaphragm, and the diaphragm moves closer to 
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the tank walls.  Near the point of total fuel depletion, the 
radial ribs of the diaphragm eventually come in contact with 
the tank wall.  Some additional diaphragm displacement 
occurs between the ribs after contact, at which point the 
rapid fuel-side pressure drop is observed. Based on tank 
geometry, diaphragm rib height and rib spacing, residual 
fuel remaining (for both tanks combined) is calculated to be 
0.6 kg. Another 1 kg was calculated to remain in the fuel 
lines, (based on fuel line geometry).    
 The TDRS-1 design provided no means of venting the 
gaseous nitrogen from the pressurant-side of the tanks; they 
will remain pressurized at about 130 psia on the pressurant-
side (even though the liquid-side dropped to 106 psia).  The 
residual ~ 1.6 kg of fuel at the completion of the fuel 
depletion phase was considered negligible.  
 
Figure 16 – Tank Pressure Signatures at Depletion  
Fuel depletion was deemed successful and compliant with 
the orbital debris requirements by the NASA Orbital Debris 
Program Office. 
Passivation 
Equipment ―passivation‖ or deactivation was driven by the 
EOM requirement to deactivate all spacecraft equipment 
that contained or produced mechanical (kinetic), 
chemical/explosive, RF, or electrical energy. Given the 
systems interdependency, careful consideration was given to 
the order of equipment passivation to avoid deactivating a 
component upon which other needed systems relied such as 
power converters, heaters, command and telemetry boxes, 
etc. TDRS-1 passivation was divided into three general 
phases as follows:  
Phase 1—When TDRS-1 could no longer support user 
operations, a subset of payload equipment was turned off.   
The approach was to deactivate as much un-needed 
equipment as possible, as early as possible beginning with 
the payload equipment. This was done in such a way as to 
gather thermal and power modeling data, which spread the 
passivation sequence over several days for payload. 
Equipment passivation began with the deactivation of the 
SSA and MA Forward and Return service components on 
21 October 2009. TWT #1 was left on for failure trending 
and was finally deactivated 11 January 2010. The remaining 
payload equipment deactivation required EOM plan 
approval.  
Phase 2—Equipment passivation—beyond what is normally 
done to place a spacecraft in  temporary on-orbit storage—
was prohibited prior to EOM plan approval to ensure that no 
irreversible passivation actions were taken. In March 2010, 
NASA Headquarters approval was granted to continue with 
deactivation. The remaining payload was deactivated in 
thermally-paced phases over 5 days starting on 17 March 
2010. Deactivation was attempted on the SAC heaters on 25 
March, but concern was raised that the SA antenna gimbal 
drives which were needed for momentum control during 
orbit raising might get too cold. This action was deferred 
and the SAC heaters were finally deactivated 16 June 2010 
immediately following the final orbit-raising burn. Upon 
completion of Phase 2, only equipment required for the fuel 
depletion burns remained activated. 
Phase 3—Phase 3 was divided into three parts in the 
mission plan [8]. The emphasis was placed on completing 
Phase 3 as quickly as possible, since critical spacecraft 
functionality was progressively disabled. 
The first part of Phase 3 consisted of the deactivation of all 
ACS and propulsion equipment. The Z-spin configuration 
was ideally suited to support this deactivation because it 
used no on board ACS control laws or thruster firings. It 
totally relied upon the stiffness produced by the rotation 
about the Z-axis for inertial attitude stability. After ACS 
deactivation, spacecraft attitude telemetry was no longer 
available.  
The second part of Phase 3 consisted of an initial EPS and final 
thermal passivation, which included disabling all remaining 
spacecraft main body heaters, and disconnecting Batteries 2 
and 3—leaving only Battery 1 for load support. Batteries were 
passivated by disconnecting both the full and trickle charge 
solar array strings, and by connecting reconditioning 
resistors to the battery terminals to deplete the remaining 
battery charge. The TDRS design had no solar array/main 
bus disconnect function. 
The third part of Phase 3 consisted of the final EPS and 
tracking, telemetry and command (TT&C) deactivations. 
Due to the Z-spin configuration, the solar arrays rotated 
from Sun facing to anti-Sun facing and back over a 12 min 
period. This presented an approximate 5.5-min window 
where the solar arrays could power the bus and allow any 
final commanding. During this window, the last battery was 
disconnected and passivated. The final TT&C passivation 
sequence began by turning off the transmitter power amplifier 
(PA) (resulting in termination of spacecraft telemetry 
downlink) and verifying carrier drop on the spectrum 
analyzer. This was immediately followed by a final command 
system reconfiguration sequence. Phase 3 was executed on 27 
June 2010 over a 128-min period, which brought TDRS-1 
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EOM activities to a close. All system passivations were 
verified as successful either directly in telemetry, by spectrum 
analyzer, or via multiple failed attempts to reacquire the 
spacecraft transponder. 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
Several conclusions can be reached as a result of the TDRS-
1 EOM campaign spanning programmatic to subsystem 
level subjects. 
Programmatic 
Two factors determined the success of the EOM campaign 
and only one of the two was controllable. The factor not 
under EOM team control was failure of any critical non-
redundant spacecraft equipment. This factor can only be 
controlled prior to the point where a failure compromises 
the spacecraft. Although TDRS-1 experienced an early orbit 
loss of redundancy, fortunately no critically disabling 
failures ensued, which allowed its operational mission and 
EOM to successfully be completed. The factor that was 
under EOM team control was thoughtful preparation and 
careful execution of the EOM plan. This methodology is 
consistent with NASA and corporate project management 
guidelines, but some key specifics are worth noting for the 
benefit of future EOM teams.  
(1) Assemble the most experienced engineering team 
available to plan and implement the EOM activity. 
EOM planning for spacecraft such as TDRS-1, with 
numerous problems or failures, should obtain the 
support from key team members who helped resolve 
the original EOM-related critical spacecraft anomalies. 
(2) Involve all teams early in the planning process. 
Understand all team member concerns and system 
constraints. 
(3) Define ―flight rules‖ to anticipate issues that may be 
encountered. Set decision criteria during the EOM 
development process—do not wait until the execution 
phase when prompt decisions may be required.  The 
flight rule concept also facilitates the process of 
seeking pre-approval for risky and/or irreversible 
actions. 
System 
At the system level, the foremost lesson to be learned is that 
an outside-the-box concept not envisioned in the original 
spacecraft design, such as Z-spin thrusting for TDRS-1, can 
and should be utilized if sufficient risk mitigation can be 
achieved prior to on-orbit execution. TDRS-1 EOM risk 
mitigation activities included appropriate analyses, 
simulations, operational rehearsals, alternate options (where 
available), and back-out plans to return the spacecraft to a 
safe, stable condition as required. Key system specifics are 
listed below. 
(1) For key technical issues that require simulation to 
understand and resolve, utilize independent simulation 
tools to the extent possible. Significant insight was 
gained when a MATLAB dynamics simulation was 
used in addition to the in-house spacecraft simulator. 
(2) Rehearse all EOM procedures to the greatest extent 
possible. Use the rehearsals to validate the EOM 
procedures as well as train all personnel that will be 
involved. 
(3) Recognize that operational procedures may have 
conservative constraints imposed that are not 
appropriate for the EOM phase. 
Subsystem 
All subsystems operated in a spacecraft configuration 
substantially different from the normal mode of operations. 
EOM subsystem specialists were able to analyze and predict 
performance in the Z-spin configuration with some degree 
of confidence using the available subsystem information. 
The key subsystem lessons learned are listed below: 
(1) Characterize the performance of equipment on-orbit 
that cannot be accurately characterized in ground 
testing. 
(2) Implement a thorough data collection and retention 
scheme during on-orbit operations that could 
potentially aid EOM analyses. 
(3) Retain spare flight-like equipment (e.g., the TDRS-1 
propellant tank) that could be used to predict EOM 
characteristics.  
(4) Dedicate multiple telemetry displays specifically for 
the EOM flight support team. This avoids conflicts 
with the needs of the operations team commanding the 
spacecraft. 
(5) Simple but meticulous propellant bookkeeping can 
result in very accurate knowledge of propellant 
remaining. TDRS-1 operators achieved an error of 
1.2% over 27 years. 
In general subsystem and system designers can take note of 
the various challenges addressed by the EOM team then 
incorporate cost-effective features into future designs to 
increase the level of confidence that EOM requirements for 
orbital debris compliance will be met, even after on-orbit 
equipment failures and degradation.  
ACRONYMS 
ACS Attitude Control Subsystem 
AGC Automatic Gain Control 
ATF Australian Tracking Data and Relay Satellite 
Facility 
CSS Coarse Sun Sensor 
CPE Control Processor Electronics 




DTC Disturbance Torque Compensation 
DTM Dual Thruster Module 
EOM End-of-Mission 
EPS Electrical Power Subsystem 
FDF Flight Dynamics Facility 
FDM Fill and Drain Module 
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center 
GEO Geosynchronous Orbit 
IMP Integrated Mission Plan 
IUS Inertial Upper Stage 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
MA Multiple Access 
MLI Multi-Layer Insulation 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration    
NASA HQ NASA Headquarters 
NASA STD NASA Standards 
NiCad Nickel Cadmium 
NPR NASA Procedural Requirements 
NSF National Science Foundation 
OTH Over-the-Horizon 
PA Power Amplifier 
PDM Propellant Distribution Module 
RAM Random Access Memory 
RCS Reaction Control Subsystem (Propulsion) 
RF Radio Frequency 
ROM Read-Only Memory 
SA Single Access 
SAC Single Access Compartment 
SEU Single Event Upset   
SGL Space to Ground Link 
SSA S-band Single Access 
STS Space Transport System 
TCS Thermal Control Subsystem 
T&C Telemetry and Command 
TT&C Tracking, Telemetry, and Command 
TDRS Tracking Data and Relay Satellite 
TMM Thermal Math Models 
TRW TRW, Inc was formerly known as 
 Thompson Ramo Wooldridge Corporation 
TSIM Tracking Data and Relay Satellite Simulator 
TWT Traveling Wave Tube 
WSC Whites Sands Complex 
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